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INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study.—All financial institutions operate within
a narrower profit margin than most other business concerns because of
their responsibilities to the public. However, none of them has as
exacting a responsibility as a commercial bank since the latter must pay
on demand, and without notice, a good share of its liabilities. Therefore,
it must expect, as a matter of course, rather large fluctuations in the
demands for its liabilities. This implies that it must have sufficient
liquidity to prepare against such fluctuations. At the same time, a
commercial bank must also be reasonably profitable if it has to meet its
obligations to stockholders.
The purpose of this study is, therefore, to analyze these basic
problems and review the practices of the commercial banking industry in
general, especially during the postwar period, in managing their funds
in view of the two conflicting requirements. Thus, in the first three
chapters, we shall measure, as far as possible, the needs of liquidity,
safety and profitability and then discuss the practices of bank fund
management. In chapter one we will see the orders of priority of using
earning assets. In the second and third chapters, the two major classes
of earning assets, investments and loans will be studied.
Generally, all commercial banks have the same problems in managing
their funds. However, the problems vary from one bank to another, depending
on the relative size, location and other differences directly affecting
the liquidity needs of banks. Therefore, in the last chapter, we shall
try to study how these problems and practices of one individual bank may
apply to those of the industry. For this purpose, we have taken the case
of management of earning assets by the Trust Company of Georgia during
1960-64, a reserve city bank in Atlanta.
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CHAPTER I
PRIORITIES IN USING EARNING ASSETS
A commercial bank is organized to provide earnings to its owners,
although it is chartered with the expectation that it will serve the
financial needs of its communities. Therefore, the statement of condi
tion of a bank, like the balance sheet of any business concern, is di
vided into assets and liabilities. Liabilities are major sources of
fund for a commercial bank. Assets are the uses to which these funds are
employed. In this chapter priorities in uses of funds are discussed.
Definition of Earning Assets
Although all assets are uses of fund, not all of them are directly
used to produce income. The practice commonly followed in publications
of banking statements is the division of assets among cash assets, earning
assets and fixed assets. Fixed assets are bank houses and premises,
furniture and fixtures. Generally, they do not produce income. Cash
assets are cash on hand and due from banks which serve as primary reserve
legal and other day to day requirements. Thus, they are charged as prac
tically unproductive assets directly.
Earning assets are assets employed, in varying degrees of liquidity,
to produce the income needs of a bank. Investments and loan portfolios
serve these needs.
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Strictly speaking, investment portfolios of a commercial bank
consist of securities, such as long term bonds, mainly employed for
the sake of earnings. However, secondary reserves, which are invest
ment securities with maturities of one year or less, are also properly
included as part of a bank's investments, therefore, as part of its
earning assets. The importance of secondary reserves in bank portfolios
will be seen in the next chapter.
Loans, the other major group constituting a commercial bank's
earning assets, are credits made to customers directly and personally.
The main difference between the two classes of earning assets is that
investments are bank credits made to the public in the open market,
whereas loans are made directly to private borrowers, most of which are
regular customers of the bank.
The First Psiority; The need for protective liquidity
All commercial banks are uniquely similar to each other in their
needs to meet withdrawals of deposits on demand and without notice. There
fore, in no other financial institution is the need for separating the
uses of fund into cash and earning assets more important than to a com
mercial bank.
However, to plan for all possible and remote contingencies of deposit
withdrawals by holding adequate cash requires foregoing earnings needlessly.
In the event that the primary reserves may not be sufficient to meet these
requirements, therefore, a bank provides additional protective liquidity
from its earning assets as a first priority in the use of such funds. Such
requirements are mostly met by acquiring securities close to cash. The
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income from these securities, substantial as it may be, takes a secondary
role as against the need for liquidity.
The Second Priority; The need to satisfy customer credit demands
Once a part of the assets is allocated as a protective liquidity,
the major part of the remaining funds is normally devoted to the making
of direct loans to customers. Loans are not only important from the point
of view of profitability, they are also essential to satisfy the credit
needs of customers from whom deposits originate. The recognition of this
priority of loans will be discussed in detail in Chapter III.
The Third Priority: Additional investment portfolio
After providing the liquidity and safety requirements and after
satisfying its customers' loan demands, a bank follows the practice of
entering the longer term investment market with the remaining balance of
its earning assets, if any. This choice may often be made to avoid too
much concentration of funds in the loan portfolio and to maintain a reason
able ratio of loans to deposits, especially if the bank's capital is rela
tively low. Also a bank may be forced into the investment market of a
long term nature if it cannot secure local loans in adequate volume. In
such a situation, it may be difficult for a bank without a specialized
investment department to attain the desired income since it lacks the ad
vantage of better management in the open market over larger competing
banks. Therefore, it is necessary to use the advice and service of special
ists which may often prove to be costly for small banks.
The growing importance of earning assets to commercial banks is
shown in Table 1. The conspicuous rise of earning assets in relation to
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total assets lately is primarily due to the business expansion nationwide,
which stimulates both direct lending and open market investments. Thus,
loans expanded almost nine times from their 1941 level, while investments
in securities increased about three and a half times. Because of such
a huge rise in the demand for credit, reserve requirements of commercial
banks are eased up, currently at 16% of deposits from a high of 257. in
the early 1940s. This primarily accounts for the relatively low rate of
increase in cash assets of commercial banks.
TABLE 1
SIZE OF EARNING ASSETS OF ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS FOR SELECTED YEARS





















































Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, July, 1962 and May, 1965.
CHAPTER II
INVESTMENT IN SECURITIES
Priorities in management of bank earning assets were discussed
in the previous chapter. It was then suggested that the first priority
is the provision of adequate liquidity. As a third priority we have
also mentioned that banks use their remaining funds in the long term
open market investment.
Functions of Bank Investments
The function of bank investment portfolio is, therefore, nothing
but the fulfillment of these two priorities. Just as the primary reason
for number one priority is the need for liquidity, the third priority is
a reflection of the need for earnings. We will now see how bank invest
ments can fulfill these two needs.
Liquidity Provision: Secondary Reserves
The need for liquidity is not confined to the banking system, but
it is a special problem for a bank. This need for liquidity is mani
fested when the bank provides, and all banks do, a certain degree of
protection by allocating a part of its assets, other than the primary
lBertrand Fox and Eli Shapiro, The American Bankers Association,
Commercial Banking Industry (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1962),
p. 272.
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reserves, for liquidity purpose. By so doing the bank supplements
a protective line of defense behind its primary reserves.
However, perhaps the most recurring problem faced by almost all
banks is the determination of the proper degree of liquidity necessary
from time to time. This problem, although common to all commercial
banks, varies within banks depending on the size or location of each
bank. Generally, however, all banks have to determine the probable
magnitude and timing of deposit withdrawals. Then, the level of loans
can be estimated in light of the priorities adopted in the uses of funds.
It is relatively easy to determine the individual bank's deposit
position if it is representative of a group of banks, state or nationwide,
because the effect is caused by general economic condition. Thus, as
shown in Chart 1, deposit movements generally reflect the state of the
nation's economy. For example, there is a sudden fall in the level of
deposits between 1957 and 19£8 because of the recession during that year.
The individual bank should not, however, rely on such a general conclusion.
For it to determine its lending and investment policies solely on the
basis of a large group of banks, and thus ignoring its own previous experi
ence of deposit movement, would be highly unrealistic and even dangerous.
Tlllhatever the nature of its deposits, a bank typically provides the
degree of liquidity deemed necessary by holding cash as primary reserves
and by owning securities convertible into cash quidcly and with a minimum
loss. Such types of securities are normally classified as secondary
reserves. The term secondary is used to identify these securities as they
are "a second line of defense behind primary reserves^ash asset^for quick
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conversion into cash to meet both expected and unforeseen demands for
funds by depositors*11 The general requirements for assets of this type
are that they should be short term (maturity of one year or under) or
high grade, and readily marketable. For this purpose, most banks rely on
their holdings of short term U. S. government securities since they evi
dently satisfy their liquidity requirements. However, other securities
having the same maturity can serve as additional secondary reserves pro
vided they are also high grade and readily marketable.
Earnings; The Tffhole Investment Portfolio
The investment accounts of a commercial bank, in practice, are its
long term bonds, which are primarily employed for the sake of earnings.
However, as shown in Chart 2, securities of shorter maturities, such as
treasury bills, may also give considerable yield. In fact, between
1961-63, the yield from such securities have approached those from notes
and bonds.
As compared to the average net return on loans, securities also give
substantial return, although loans are, conventionally, the major source
of income for commercial banks. This relationship is indicated in Table 2.
This table also shows that, although bank securities are mainly held in
their short, hence less profitable form, the rate of increase in the
average returns on both loans and investments annually are the same*
Thus, from 1955 to 1956, the rate increased by about 10$ in both
2lyle E. Gramley, "Deposit Instability at Commercial Banks,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Essays on Commercial Banking, (August,
1962), p. 6.
TABLE 2
COMPARATIVE AVERAGE NET RETURN ON LOANS OF INSURED












Sources: Annual Reports, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1963 and 1965*
cases* For the next year, the increase was 9% and Q% for loans and
investments respectively. In dollar amounts, the income from invest
ments was about #1.6 billion for all commercial banks, in 1961;. This
was 18$ of all revenues from earning assets. Therefore, in spite of the
volatility of marketable securities, they form a significant amount of
total commercial bank earnings.
Kinds of Bank Investment Portfolio
Primarily, commercial banks own two kinds of securities, obligations
























bonds. In practice, however, banks acquire corporate bonds when they
can afford to, although such securities do not appeal to commercial
banks in view of their liquidity position.
United States Government 'Securities
Investment standings—Securities issued by the federal government,
or those guaranteed by it, are defined as being "riskless assets in as
much as there is no doubt that interest and principal on every issue will
be paid promptly at maturity.11^ The primary role of government securi
ties in bank portfolios is therefore, to provide liquidity and safety
and then to produce Income, if possible. In this respect, they are unique
among the various kinds of bank securities.
Normally, four marketable securities are issued by the government.
They are, in order of maturity, treasury bills, certificates of indebted
ness, notes, and bonds. They are high grade. In their short form they
are also the only securities that satisfy the basic qualifications of
securities for secondary reserves. They can be quickly sold with minimum
loss, if at all, on the principal. This is a special advantage for com
mercial banks to meet their liquidity problems. As a result, commercial
banks are one of the most important groups of investors in government
securities. Thus, in 1°6U» they held almost 30% of the total marketable
U. S. government securities outstanding. Although they have actually
reduced their ownership of such securities from the level just after World
3llajor B. Einstein, "Investing for Banking,*1 Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, (July 20, l°6l), p. 1*.
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TABLE 3
OWNERSHIP OF U. S. GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS BY ALL
COMMERCIAL BANKS FOR SELECTED PERIODS












































Sources Federal Reserve Bulletin, February, 1965*
War II, they are, today, the second most important owners, after indi
viduals. However, not only have commercial banks reduced their volume
of government securities, but these securities are also decreasing in
relation to total bank investments, as shown in Table 3* The latter
result may be explained by the yield advantage from municipal bonds.
Thus, in trying to increase their tax exempt securities, banks have
generally tended to reduce their government holdings beyond those serving
secondary reserve requirements. Moreover, in order to satisfy the great
demand for loans that resulted in the post war business expansion, com
mercial banks have reduced their government securities. Thus, in 1959
alone, about three-fifths of the funds needed for loans came from sale
12
of government securities.'1 On the other hand, when there is a declining
demand for loans, such as the recession of 1957-58, commercial banks1
principal response is to increase the demand for government securities,
and decrease their maturity (Table h) as there would be excess funds
beyond loan demands.
TABLE it
COMMERCIAL BANK OWNERSHIP OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
BI MATURITY FOR SELECTED PERIODS





























































Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, February, 1965.
Maturity.—Generally, when securities are held longer, they would
iPox and Shapiro, p. h>
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offer higher yields. However, since liquidity needs are more important
than returns from government securities, banks must be prepared to sell
their longer term maturities or to acquire more securities to satisfy
their liquidity needs*
During the past ten years, commercial banks have become more aware
of the role of government securities as major source of liquidity. Thus,
in Table U, we see that in all the years, except the first two, over 80$
of commercial banks1 government securities matured within five years, and
less emphasis is being put on securities especially maturing beyond ten
years. At the same time, in order to get higher yields from the short
maturity securities, commercial banks hold more securities in the 1-5 year
maturity than those maturing in less than a year.
Thus, in spite of the fact that investment income is secondary to
safety and liquidity, commercial banks have not ignored the possibility
of earnings from government securities* On the other hand, although
earnings from investment portfolios of commercial banks are substantial,
they are limited by regulations imposed by the government on the quality
and amount of such securities owned.
Yield*--It is said that investments in government securities are free
from risk in as much as there is no decline in quality of the investment
or insolvency of the debtor. Yet, the investor who buys long term or short
term bonds (and commercial banks are important owners of the latter) and
later needs to recover his principal by resale prior to maturity faces
the risk of a price decline resulting from a rising level of interest
rates. Such a risk is called the interest rate risk and it is especially
significant to commercial banks not only because of the volume of their
security ownerships, but also their liquidity is a constant problem forcing
them to sell their short term holdings.
The volatility of yields on U. S. government securities can be under-
stood clearly by referring to Chart 2. It may be observed that although
yields on long term securities fluctuate considerably, there is greater
fluctuation in treasury bills, securities preferred by banks for their
liquidity* Viewed from the yield angle, therefore, there are obvious diffi
culties facing the banker.
The spacing of maturities to avoid such unexpected fluctuations in
the yield, which is bound to affect the market price of securities, is not
a matter of precise solution. Generally, it may be advisable to hold more
of the long term maturities and be willing to sell them shortly where low-
price and high yield exist. This can reduce the risk in fluctuations of
market prices due to changes in yields to a certain extent. On the other
hand, "a bank need not hesitate to lengthen its average maturity when
yields are high, nor need it refuse to contract maturities when yields seem
relatively low by historical standards."**
%alph E. Badger, Harold W. Torgerson, and Harry G. Guthman, Invest
ment Principles and Practices, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., Fifth
Edition, 1963), p. WLB.
Roland I. Robinson, Management of Bank Funds (2nd Ed. rev*, New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 352.
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State and Municipal Obligations
Quality of municipals,—Obligations of state and local governments,
also called municipals, are the second most important investment outlets
for commercial banks. As an investment standing they are excelled only
by securities of the federal government. Since wide range exists between
the best and the poorest quality of municipals, regulatory and supervisory
authorities have recommended that, for bank investment purposes, only the
four highest ratings are eligible.a in general, therefore, commercial
banks exercise a high degree of conservation in their choice of municipal
bonds. Yet, during the last two decades, they have increased their munici
pal portfolios while they have tended to reduce their government securities.
Between 191*0 and 196k the amount of commercial banks1 municipals jumped
from $f>«6 billion to About $28*9 billion, an increase from a little over
$% of total commercial bank securities to over 30$. On the other hand,
Idle conspicuous decline in their ownership of government securities can
be seen in fable 3. The primary reason for this is the yield advantage
of buying municipals over governments, as shown in Table 5>.
Yield and maturity*—The main purpose for the presence of municipals
in bank portfolios is for earnings, just as the purpose for government securi
ties is mainly for liquidity. The best reason that makes municipals attrac
tive to commercial banks is that they are the principal tax reducing outlets
Goody's Government and Industrial Manual lists the four highest
classes of municipals as: Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa.
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since interest earned on aill state and local obligations is fully exempt
from federal taxes. This provides a special incentive to purchase such
securities especially for banks in the higher tax bracket. The relative
advantage of otming municipal bonds from the point of view of yield alone
can be seen from Table $ for banks in the higher tax bracket. Thus, in
1$$9, a bank with applicable tax rate of J>2$ should have earned $,$6% on
its government securities in order to get an equivalent yield to its tax
exempt securities. Therefore,the table shows that banks paying the higher
tax rate would be better off to possess municipals than governments con
sidered only from the yield standpoint.
While yields from municipals may be appealing to commercial banks,
they are faced with a perplexing problem in forming a maturity policy for
tax exempt securities. Typically, when the yields on municipals are most
favorable (which assumes a fall in their demand) the demand for loans also
rises. But since banks have to fulfill the loan needs of their customers
first, they will not be able to buy municipals at depressed prices and
earn higher yields from them. Moreover, since these securities do not have
a particularly good liquidity standing, it is disadvantageous for banks
to hold them for a short time. Therefore, if municipals are to be bought,
it should be on the assumption that they will be hald to final maturity
to give the maximum available yield, since they are mainly acquired for
their yields.
Corporate Securities
Corporate securities are not an important part of commercial bank
investments. Their relative significance has actually declined in this
18
TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE AVERAGE YIELDS ON TAX EXEMPT SECURITIES AND
U. S. GOVERNMENT TAXABLE BONDS HELD BY COMMERCIAL
BANKS DURING SELECTED YEARS
Before Tax Average After-Tax Average Average Yield
Year Yield on Governments Yield on Governments* OaaTax; Exempts
1951 2.57 !•& !•&
1953 2.9U 1*76 1.92
1955 2.8!i 1.70 2.01*
1957 3-^7 2.08 2.22
1959 U.08 2.1*8 2.57
1961 3.97 2.38 2.9k
1963 U.20 2.52 3.H
1961* U.23 2.53 3.25
*The after-tax yield on government securities is determined
assuming an average of U0$ income tax for all commercial banks.
Source: Moody1s Government and Municipal Manuals and Moody's Bond
Survey.
respect over the past years. At the end of 19U7, they accounted for
a little over 1% of total commercial bank earning assets and less than
3% of their investments. By June, 1961}, these ratios were less than
1% and about 2% respectively. This relative decline of corporate bonds
as bank securities over the past periods is primarily due to the emergence
of term loans for commercial banks as a much more desirable medium for
1$
granting longer term credits to businesses than corporate bond pur-
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chases.
Corporate bonds are purchased by commercial banks for the higher
yields they offer than most other securities. At the same time, they
present a relatively greater risk than municipal bonds. As previously
mentioned, regulations governing the size of a bank's securities would
also apply especially on its corporate bonds. Such a limit varies de
pending on the nature of the capital structure, loan-deposit ratio and
the qualities of other risk assets. Therefore, banks usually give the
last priority for corporate securities since their liquidity position may
not allow them to speculate for greater yield and capital gains. Such
securities are, however, particularly attractive for banks with low level
of earnings and in a low tax bracket as all corporate securities are
subject to taxes. They can also prove to be attractive for banks with
serious deficiency in loan demand and consequently, a surplus of funds
available for such investments*
Flexibility in Bank Portfolio Management
In spite of the fact that bank portfolio management has been largely
responsible for the banking systems1 contribution to the credit needs of
the economy, commercial banks have fallen short of perfection in their
endeavors of portfolio management. Individual banks have shown this de
ficiency either in income lost through maintenance of excess liquidity
or in capital losses incurred when insufficient liquidity forced sales
7Einstein, 3>.
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of securities at unfavorable prices.
Diversification
At best all portfolios of commercial banks, other than United States
government securities, have credit risks of various types. Although such
risks cannot be eliminated, they can be minimized by spreading securities
among the various maturity classes and over several geographical locations.
The basic philosophy behind this is that if losses occur the spreading of
securities will tend to reduce them to about their average probable value.
We have seen how commercial banks have generally distributed their
securities between the various investment classes. Thus, the; fact that
over 80$ of their government securities matured within the first 5 years
(Table J>) may prove that, from the income point of view , it is a dis
advantage. However, bearing in mind the faet that the whole problem of
flexibility in portfolio management revolves around the conflicting needs
of liquidity and earnings, this conclusion may very well be wrong. On
the other hand, commercial banks have also increased their purchase of
the less liquid municipal bonds and even the riskier corporate securities
in pursuit of higher yields* Thus, although diversification (particularly
by maturity) is highly essential, an elaborately'diversified portfolio
is usually- advisable to the large bank with an investment staff adequate
to supervise a large number of issues.
Balance and Timing
After the investment outlets and period are selected, and the degree
of diversification planned, the next issue is determining the proportion
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in which securities are to be held in the various maturity classes from
time to time. Although the problem is mainly a matter of personal judg
ment of the bank's needs, the prudent banker can have some insight by
forecasting future probabilities within and outside the bank. In many
cases, the necessity of changing the proportion among the earning asset
classes, or reducing them by changing to cash in the event of unusual
deposit losses depends on trends in the regional and national economy.
For the purpose of portfolio management, the prices at which present
holdings of securities were acquired are irrelevant to the determination
8
of whether present securities constitute the optimum use of funds* For
example, if the bank holds tiro issues of securities with different yields,
it might be better in the interest of ultimate gains to change the lower
yield securities to the higher or vice versa although some loss may be
incurred. For that matter, sale of securities at a loss has tax advantages
especially for commercial banks. While capital losses of other businesses
are deductible only from capital gains realized during that year for tax
purposes, there are no restrictions on the amount of deductions for com
mercial banks.
Loan Demand
The need to satisfy customer credit demands has been mentioned in
Chapter I as a second priority in the use of earning assets. Accordingly,
long term investments take a secondary role in relation to the demand for
^Gramley, 9.
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loans. The great expansion of loans has meant that commercial banks
have lost a large part of the big liquidity cushion they possessed in
the investment portfolio during the early postwar years. Therefore,
problems of portfolio management are substantially different today from
those periods. Generally, commercial banks have used intelligent plan
ning in spacing the maturity periods of their securities in such a manner
that they will be redeemed to meet loan requirements. On the other hand,
during recessions, such as those of 19B3-$k and 1957-58, commercial banks'
response is to increase greatly the demand for securities because of the
declining demand for loans. The extent of diversification of securities
by maturity during such periods depends on the probable duration of the
recession. Generally, the longer the recession the more securities in
longer maturity years should be held.
CHAPTER III
LOANS
Functions of the Loan Account
While banks engage in a large number of financial activities, the
central business of commercial banks is the making of loans, to customers.
It is also their most profitable type of business since they almost always
obtain a higher return than from investments (See Table 2)«
Commercial banks' lending, however, involves certain problems and
even some dangers. Bank lending typically involves varying degrees of
credit risk, although commercial banks might like to think of their bor
rowing customers as among the very best* Thus, while the need for profit
takes a primary consideration, safety and liquidity are important ele
ments also to be met in bank loans.
Profitability
The latest available data shows the total earnings from loans made
by insured commercial banks as $6.9 billions in 196k as compared to
$1*5 billions from investments. This lead has been maintained ever since
commercial banks increased their loan portfolios over their securities
during the postwar period* Also, as shown in Table 2, the average return
on loans is greater than the average return on commercial bank securities.
The most important factor determining the amount earned by banks
is 1die average rate of interest on loans. Banks operating in major money
23
market centers charge the prime rate on a significant proportion of
their loans. This rate is a formally announced rate adopted by the
major money market banks and is charged on unsecured loans to their
best preferred customers. Until 1953, prime rates were almost always
lower than the prevailing yields on new issues of high grade corporates.
Since 1953, however, prime rates are higher and the differential rate
is about l/2£.
Outside large cities, the rates charged are rates considered custo
mary or equitable within those areas. Beyond the prime and customary
rates the rate paid on loans differ even on identical grants. Variations
are due to differences in risk, time, size of the loan, or size of the
borrower. Such differences are reflected in Table 7. Evidently, this
depends on the relative cost of bank lending, which is directly related
to the risk involved. And risk is usually associated with size of borrow
er. As indicated in this table, interest rates charged on business loans
tend to vary inversely with the size of the borrower. The size of the
borrower normally gives evidence to the size of the lender as well, since
larger businesses mostly tend to borrow from larger banks.? Since also
large banks happen to be in large cities where large businesses are
located, the lower interest rates charged by city banks than country
banks can be primarily accounted for this reason. Not only does the
interest rate vary from reserve city to city and country banks, it also
^Leonardo Lodadio, "Size of Banks, Size of Borrower and the Inter
est Rate," Journal of Finance, (March, 1963), p. ZU
ranges according to the size, hence according to the risk of the borrower
within these areas*
There is, however, more involved in most bank lending than merely
appraising the borrower's credit standing. Increasingly, bank loan
officers demand that their customers keep part of the borrowed funds on
deposit—frequently 20$, although requirements vary depending upon the
bargaining power of the borrower (which is, of course, influenced by
its credit standing) and the state of the money market. These compen
sating balances add to the cost of credit to the borrower. If, for
example, $100 is borrowed at h% interest and $20 is required as a compen
sating balance, the effective interest rate becomes $%. Beside their
yield advantage, compensating balances make funds available for loans
to more customers, particularly when credit is tight.
Safety and Liquidity
The special need for commercial bank liquidity is emphasized in
the previous two chapters. In this connection we have also seen that
one of the basic responsibilities of the banker is to be able to meet
withdrawal of deposits by maintaining sufficient liquidity. The basic
objectives served in the making of loans ares 1) to meet responsibilities
to business by providing credit, when justified, and 2) to select loans
which provide an overall liquidity for deposits by an adequate system
of credit analysis.
Loans are not particularly suited to meet immediate requirements
of liquidity. In fact, too many loans (measured in terms of deposits
or capital) are detrimental to safety and liquidity. The liquidity of
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banks as measured by the ratio of their short term government securi
ties to deposits has also declined while loans expanded during the
postwar period. Banks have generally become in danger of their liquidi
ty position, as a result. However, as the loan-deposit ratio for all
banks increased (from 52$ in 1950 to over 60% in 1°6U), banks that have
been increasing their capital structure steadily can probably be sounder
and stronger than ever, since growing capital provides additional cushion
of safety for increased ownership of risk assets.
In spite of the fact that loans are not generally expected to meet
immediate liquidity requirements, they are also a source of liquidity
as they mature. Although present data are not available, for the periods
shown in Table 6, business loans were concentrated in the one year or less
maturity period for all member banks. This shows, perhaps in part, the
slower growth in deposit than loans so that the turnover for loans had
to be increased to accommodate more loan applications. Moreover, as the
tendency to reduce government securities (conventionally "the best source
of liquidity) exists at commercial banks, there must be a counter effect
by shortening loan maturities. More will be said about this in the next
part of this chapter.
Major Kinds of Bank Loans
Before the depression of the 1930s, banks limited their loans
almost only to businesses not only because they were the only institu
tions to provide such loans, but also the other avenues of lending were
lOMilton J. Drake, "Liquidity and Loan Policy Today," Bankers
Monthly, (June, I960), p. 22.
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TABLE 6
BUSINESS LOANS AT MEMBER BANES BY MATURITY, FOR SELECTED YEARS
(Amount In billions of dollars)
Maturity











Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
not well developed until the 19li0s. Today, however, commercial banks
have a significant role in the extension of credits for other purposes
as well, notably mortgage and consumer financing.
Commercial Loans
As noted earlier, meeting the needs of the business community has
been the prime function of the commercial banking industry since its
origin. In 1929, total commercial bank loans constituted over 80$ of
their earning assets, and almost all of them were in business loans.
Today, due to the other loan activities of commercial banks, this
relationship is roughly 6k% as shown in Table 1. Yet, business loans
still remain to be the single most important class in bank loan portfolios,
Since no other group of investor or lender is equipped to provide the
same essential lending service to business on equivalent terms. As their
loan activities expanded after the Great Depression, commercial banks
have tended to separate their loans into working capital loans, also
called short term loans, and term loans, for financing longer term projects.
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Short-term loans.—-Traditionally, the average commercial concern
relies on the commercial bank chiefly for seasonal or other short-term
cash requirements as these banks are particularly suited to meet such
needs* Thus, short term loans, defined in the Federal Reserve Surveys
as "loans of one year maturity or under at the time of extension}' remain
the largest in volume of commercial bank loans to businesses (Table 6),
although term loans are fast gaining widespread acceptance, especially
in large city banks like New York as shown on Table 8*
As already discussed, the profitability of loans, apart from eco
nomic conditions, is directly related to the size of the loan, and hence
the size of the borrower. Typically, this applies to short term loans as
Table 7 reflects. As the loan size decreases, the interest charged in
creases. This shows that smaller businesses tend to present greater
risks (mainly because most of them are relatively new) and therefore high
er interest could be charged on them. In addition, Table 7 shows that the
rates charged also reflect the economic conditions prevailing during certain
periods. Thus, the yield on loans was generally very low between 1930-^5
as a result of the depression in the 1930s and the sladcening of loan
demand during the war periods. After 1°Jj5, rates have gradually increased
as prosperity continued with slight cyclical fluctuations.
Apparently, short term loans are the most liquid of all bank loans.
However, since most borrowers establish a line of credit with banks, it
gives room for a constant renewal of such loans. This has, undoubtedly,
an adverse effect upon liquidity position of banks, particularly when
there is a repeated request for renewal, which warrants all is not well
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with the borrower. Commercial banks, therefore, need to exercise great
caution in managing these loans since they deal often with borrowers with
chronic demand for working capital loans* Such borrowers, as already
mentioned, tend to be new and, therefore, present greater risk than larger
business borrowers.
Term loans,—Business loans carrying a maturity of more than one
year are generally classified as term loans. Perhaps tte biggest single
change in the nature of commercial bank lending after World War II has
been the growth of term loans. According to the National Bureau of Econom
ic Research Study of 191*0, the volume of such loans held by commercial
banks was 02.2 billion at the end of that year. This was 8$ of total
loans and about k*$% of total earning assets. On December 31, 196U, total
term loans were $29 billion, or 17$ of loans and US of earning assets of
commercial banks as estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New Tork. In
terms of business loans alone, this figure stands at over 50$.
The reason for such a fast growth in term loans can be viewed as
a displacement of commercial bank corporate bond ownership before the
War periods. Prom the point of view of the borrower, term loans have
a more significant appeal to big businesses which could command open mar
ket credit but prefer not to disclose such details of their businesses as
would be required by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Consequently,
such loans are made more frequently and on a greater volume by big city
banks, which, for reasons already discussed, favor large borrowers. Thus,
as reflected in Table 8, whether measured by the importance of such loans
or by the share of the larger banks in the term loan market, term loans
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TABLE 7
BANK RATES ON SHORT TIERS! BUSINESS LOANS AT BANKS




































































n.a. - note available
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, July, 1962, May 1965.
play a more important role at the large city banks, particularly New York,
than at other banks. Thus, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, at the end of 1961i such loans constituted over 58$ of all business
loans at the New York City banks while the relationship was only about
33$ at other member banks. The greater importance of term loans at New
York City banks largely reflects the fact that these banks service large
customers located throughout the country and abroad. Moreover, instead
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TABLE 8
TERM LOANS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUSINESS LOANS
AND TO SELECTED INDUSTRIAL BORROWERS, 19£5 AND 1957


















Petroleum, Coal, Chemical & Rubber
Transportation and Utilities
Metal and Metal products
Sources Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
of locking themselves in with a debt-offering fixed interest rate in the
capital markets, big businesses like term loan financing (Table 8) especi
ally when rates are high. This is because the rates they pay on their
11
borrowing are tied to the prime rate and will go down when rates ease.
Many criticisms are forwarded against the significance banks attached
to term loans. Thus Alfred Hayes, president of the Federal Reserve Bank
"Lending Problems—Term Loans," Business Week, (July 30, I960),
p. 111*.
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of New Toxic, has warned banks against becoming Mso heavily committed in
the form of long term advances that they cannot adequately meet the
legitimate short term needs for which commercial banking provides unique
12
facilities." An important factor behind this argument seems to be that
banks might find themselves in unnecessarily frozen position that could
hurt their liquidity.
Although Mr. Hayes1 argument may be justifiable to a certain extent,
it must also be admitted that the prime function of term loans for larger
banks is to realize higher earnings that could be earned from making a
large loan to a large borrower. Moreover, since virtually all term loans
are written with provisions for regular amortization—as opposed to the
line of credit established by short term borrowers—-they provide a con
siderable degree of liquidity. Thus, while the final maturity on a term
loan might be for five years, the average maturity could be 2^ years or
even less depending on the repayment terms specified.
Mortgage Loans
The National Housing Act of 19$k provided a landmark in the develop
ment of mortgage lending by commercial banks as well as by other lenders.
This act not only required that insured mortgates be fully amortized but
also made available to mortgage lenders that, in the event of default,
such loans were exchangeable for government guaranteed bonds or cash.
Thus, commercial banks are one of the four major mortgage lending
institutions today, as shown in Table 9* Totally, the four institutions
12"Term Lending By New Tork City Banks," Federal Reserve Bank of










held over 83$ of such loans in 1961* of -which over 13$ was held by com
mercial banks. This was 2$% of their total loans and 16$ of their
earning assets. In 191*55 these were 18$ and k% respectively.
TABLE 9
SHARE OF ALL MORTGAGE LOANS HELD BY SELECTED INSTITUTIONS,
IN 19i»5 AND 196U
Institutions 191*5 1961*





Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, February, 1965.
The relative importance of commercial bank mortgage lending is
directly related to the expansion in savings deposits. Savings deposits
are quite stable in character. As a result, such kinds of funds can be
placed in large part in mortgage loans without fear that heavy withdrawal
will give rise to liquidity problem. This fact also accounts for the
larger proportion of mortgage loans to total loans in country than in
city banks. Thus, according to the Commission on Money and Credit of
the American Bankers Association, on December 31, I960, total country
bank mortgage loans amounted to $12.4 billion, or 18$ of their total
earning assets. For banks in New York City the total was less than
3k
$1 billion, and about 3% of their earning assets. The reason is that
demand for other loans are so heavy that large city banks limit accommo
dations to the real estate sector. By contrast, banks in growing sub
urban areas may devote a large part of their loanable funds since these
may very well constitute the chief credit need of the community.
As far as their profitability is concerned, mortgage loans compare
favorably with the average return of total loans of the commercial banking
industry. For the period 1961-61; average interest rates on mortgages were
5«98, 5»*93j 5«8l, and $»7k respectively on all loans of commercial banks,
as shown on Table 7*
Commercial banks are unique among the important sources of mortgage
credits in the diversity and scope of their lending. They are the only
institutions among them that seek to serve all types of credit risks,
therefore requiring a major flexibility in their portfolio. Despite the
great advantage of regular amortization, mortgage loans provide consider
ably less portfolio flexibility than other classes of loans. In spite of
this, "if commercial banks do not play a prominent role in mortgage lending,
it will have serious implications not only for them but also for the public
as well," naecause the public provides the savings deposits needed for
such loans.
Consumer Loans
It is only since World War II that consumer credit by commercial
banks had grown from a relatively minor part of banks1 loan portfolio to
IE. Flexney, "The Role of Banks in Mortgage Lending," Borrough's
Clearing House, (September, 1963), p. Ii6»
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its present position as one of the three major classes of bank loans.
Today, commercial banks have no major competitor in extending consumer
loans. They are followed by sales finance companies, credit unions and
consumer finance companies and in that order. In fact, sales finance and
consumer finance companies do borrow from commercial banks to make consumer
credits. Total bank loans to individuals, both installment and noninstall-
ment, increased over twenty times from 19\& to 1961;, or from $l,k billion to
$29»k billion. Daring the same period, all other bank loans increased only
seven times. The latest consumer credits of commercial banks constituted
16% of their total loans and 11$ of their earning assets.
Prior to the 1900's, direct consumer lending by commercial banks was
conducted on a highly selective basis. "Bank attitudes began to change,
inevitably, as the record of these loans, however reluctantly they may have
been extended originally, demonstrated their favorable performance."^ Not
only were sources of personal credit information improved, but also there
has been an extensive market for such loans as the needs of consumers
expanded and became more sophisticated. Perhaps, consumer financing by
commercial banks received their greatest Impetus out of the growth in the
demand for consumer credit, associated with the mass appeal of the auto
mobile. Another factor is the decline in the relative importance of
retail outlets as consumer financing institutions. Thus, while consumer
credit held by banks increased from 25$ of all consumer loans in 19US to
31% in l°6li, those held by retail outlets decreased at the same time from
and Shapiro, p. 163.
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to 2$%, It is clear from Table 10 that within commercial banks
themselves distribution of consumer loans is uneven. Thus, although
banks with deposits of $50 million dollars and over extending consumer
credits -were only about h% of all insured commercial banks on June 10,
1959, they held over 60% of the consumer loans by such banks. Although
large basics have, obviously, more demand from the commercial and indus
trial borrowers, they have still more funds than smaller banks for con
sumer and real estate loans. Also the extent to which individual banks
are engaged in direct consumer lending is often influenced by the presence
of or absence of competing financial institutions.
TABLE 10
DISTRIBUTION BY SIZE OF INSURED CCMMERCIAL BANKS EXTENDING
CONSUMER CREDIT, JUNE 10, 1959 =
Size of Banks Number of Banks Percentage of All
(Deposits in millions of dollars) Consumer Loans
Less than 2 hP$k 1.9%
2 to 50 8661 37.7
50 and over 1*82 60.1
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, December 31, I960.
Clearly, consumer loans have a great advantage to the consumer and
to the general growth of the economy. Through experience bank manage
ments have learned to handle this relatively new type of lending efficient
ly and safely. As shown on Chart 3, loss rates have been held at low
levels. Although there are no statistics on the earnings of commercial
37
banks from these loans, they generally give higher yields because of the
risk they involve.
Consumer loans are, however, different from commercial loans. Where
as -working capital or long term loans to business borrowers usually en
large their capacity to realize profits and repay -the loan, consumer loans
as a rule do not increase the money income of the borrower. To recover
the borrowed funds, therefore, the lender must depend on the continuity
of normal income of the consumer and upon his fundamental honesty to meet
his obligations. Moreover, consumer credit is increasing at a faster rate
than the rate of personal disposable income. "This carries the danger
that the market for those consumer goods bought largely with installment
credit may become temporarily saturated,nl* so that this important source
of outlet of commercial bank funds may prove to be less reliable and less
profitable as long as this trend continues.
l5Cosmir A. Sienkwiez, "Need for Caution at Present in Case of
Consumer Credit,11 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, (April 7, I960),
p. 10.
CHART 3
A MONTHLY REPORT COMPILED 3Y
INSTALMENT CREDIT COMMITTEE, THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION
DATA AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1964
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CHAPTER IV
THE TRUST COMPANY OF GEORGIA: EARNING ASSET
MANAGEMENT DURING 196O-6U
Investments and loans constitute tile two major classes of the
earning assets of the Trust Company of Georgia, like in any other
commercial bank. During 1960-61* earning assets of the bank were made up
of an average of 69% of its total assets. There were not considerable
changes in the composition of these assets, as shown in Table 11, during
this period except for a corresponding rise in the level of cash assets
in 1962. The average earning assets for all commercial banks in the 6th
District during the same period was slightly over 16%. This figure is
considerably higher than that of the Trust Company because, as a group,
banks in this district have a higher earning assets figure both in terms
of dollar amounts and as a percentage of total assets than reserve city
banks, Although the Trust Company is supposed to own higher cash assets
ratio than the average (for the 6th district) since it is a reserve city
bank, it has, evidently, greater loan demands at the same time. Thus,
while the cash assets were 22$ of total assets of all member banks in the
6th District in 1961*, those of the Trust Company were also about 23$
during the same year.
Like any other commercial bank, the characteristics of the earning




EARNING ASSETS OP THE TRUST COMPANY OF GEORGIA, 1960-61*
















































Sources 7l*th Annual Report, Trust Company of Georgia, I96I4.
This fact may be seen from Chart k which shows the level of the bank's
deposit during the period under study, as compared to its loans and
investments. Noticeable fluctuations in the level of deposits are absent
in this chart. Consequently, the level of both classes of assets are sub
ject to considerable fluctuations, so that portfolio management problems
from both the point of y&m of safety and profitability were not as acute
as they would have been for a small country bank with deposits of a highly
volatile nature. In view of this hindsight on the nature of its deposits,
we shall now try to study the two classes of earning assets separately.
First we shall see the characteristics of its securities between I960 and I96I4.
*Although time deposits were only about 26% of total deposits in
1961*, they accounted for over Sk% of the total increase in deposits be


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Trust Company of Georgia owns almost exclusively United States
government securities and state and municipal bonds in its investment
account. Lite many other commercial banks, ownership of corporate bonds
is avoided because of the relatively higher risk attached to them and the
increasing demand for direct borrowing from its customers.
The management of securities by the Trust Company of Georgia during
196O-6I* is summarized in Table 12. Again, the majority of securities are
held in the form of government obligations although municipals are in
creasing in the investment portfolios of the Trust Company more than the
government securities. Thus, while total government securities were in
creased by about 33% in l$6k from their I960 level, municipals were more
than doubled during the same period. This relationship is more or less
maintained also by the Sixth Federal Reserve Banks and generally by banks
throughout the nation.
From the point of view of maturity, reference to the table would
also reflect that, as usual, the bank satisfied its liquidity requirements
with its government portfolios more than municipals. This is especially
true for the periods after 1962 when the bank acquired, for the first time,
perhaps, municipals maturing over ten years. In order to compensate for
such less liquid municipal bonds, the average maturity of government bonds
was kept at a reasonably low level. However, the most conspicuous change
in the maturities of Trust Company's securities took place between I960
and 1961. In this year, more than 75% of the government bonds and h2% of
municipals had maturities of less than one year, thus giving an average
maturity of 0*9 years for governments and 2.6 years for municipals. On the
k3
TABLE 12
AMOUNT, MATURITY AND YIELD OF SECURITIES






























































Source: 7l*th Annual Report, Trust Company of Georgia, 1961*.
(Figures for the average yields were supplied by Mr. Bruce E.
Campbell, Jr., Assistant Vice President, of the bank).
other hand, only 37$ of securities and 22$ of municipals matured in less
than a year in just the previous year (I960). Reference has been made to
the records of maturities of all securities owned by member banks in the
6th Federal Reserve District between I960 and 1962, although data for
latter years are not available. Accordingly, only 19% of all securities
had maturities of less than a year. Nor has there been such a drastic
change in maturities of all national commercial banks, as seen in Table 5*
Mr. Bruce E. Campbell, Jr., Assistant Vice President of the bank, explained
this course taken by the bank as a response to the yield situation. Thus,
due to the fall in both the long and short term interest rates during this
period, long term securities had to be sold at profit so as to wait for
a rise in the yields later. It is, however, the opinion of the writer
that such an action could not have resulted in an increase in total
investments in 1961 (Table 11) unless more short term bonds were purchased*
Strangely enough, the average yield on government securities increased
from 3.30$ in I960 to 3.h$% in 1961, in spite of the fact that three-fourth
of these securities matured in less than one year.
The yields from the bank's securities compare favorably to those of
the average yields for member banks in the 6th District. Thus, in 1961),
while the Trust Company earned 3*95/3 before taxes on its government securi
ties, all commercial banks in this district had a before tax return of 3.72$.
More particularly, banks in the same region with deposits of over $100 mil
lion, that also includes the Trust Company, made only an average of 3.61$
on their government securities. The after-tax yield on government securi
ties cannot compare to the tax-exempt municipals since the bank is in a
higher tax bracket, thus favoring ownership of municipals. Like in most
other commercial banks, municipals serve the bank's need for earnings
more than that of liquidity. As noted earlier, since the bank acquired
significant amounts of securities with maturities of ten years and over
after 1962, we see in the table a relative increase in the overall yields
of securities too after that year*
The main functions performed by government securities as secondary
reserves of commercial banks, and municipals, primarily to satisfy income
needs, are also fulfilled by these tiro securities of the Trust Company
of Georgia. The individuality of a bank from that of a general picture




Loans constitute a greater part of the earning assets of the Trust
Company of Georgia. In spite of the increase in the investment account
of the bank, loans constituted over 70$ of the earning assets in any
period during 1960-6U, while the highest such ratio for all member banks
in the 6th District was only 63% in 1962. In terms of deposits, loans
were over 60% for the Trust Company between I960 and 196ii, whereas for the
6th District they were $k% in 196U, the highest in any year between I960
and 196U. The rise in loans of the Trust Company is generally due to the
corresponding rise in deposits but, more significantly, due to the fact
that the bank limits its securities only to governments and municipals
so that remaining funds would accommodate more loan demands*
The essential features of the loan account of the Trust Company are
presented in Table 13. The bank's loan portfolio consists of the three
major classes usually acquired by commercial banks, namely, commercial
loans, real estate loans and consumer loans. The last two classes consti
tute nearly $0% of all loans and, in fact, in 1961;, they were over half
of total loans. * Combined, real estate and consumer loans have almost
doubled in dollar amount in I96I4 over their I960 level. Yet, while the
relative importance of these two classes of loans in the bank's loan port
folio has been increasing, commercial loans still remain the most important
type of loans singly, like all commercial banks. However, while these
loans have also increased by a considerable amount between I960 and 196U,
the little importance term loans had in the Trust Company's loan portfolio
appears to be even decreasing. Thus, they were reduced from 19# of com
mercial loans (already loir) to a low of 12$. They also decreased in terms
of absolute amount. This effect shows itself in the relative profitabili
ty of loans of the Trust Company of Georgia to those banks of the same size
group in the 6th District.
TABLE 13
LOANS OF THE TRUST COMPAKIY OF GEORGIA BT CLASS AND THEIR
PROFITABILITY COMPARED TO MEMBER BANES IN THE










































































(1) Trust Company of Georgia, 7l*th Annual Report, 196U, and Interview
with Mr. Campbell.
(2) Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1960-6U Operating ratios for
6th Federal Reserve District Member manks.
For all periods shown in Table 13, Trust Company's loans have given
lower returns than comparable barks in the 6th District, in spite of the
fact that the bank had lower time deposit ratio than other banks, for which
U7
it had to pay interest. Possibly one positive reason for this is that
since the Trust Company earns a substantial amount of its income (about 3$%
in 196k alone) from fees, particularly from Trust services, the bank did
not try to maximize returns from loans. On the other hand, although short
term loans would accommodate the needs of more small customers than term
loans, and also have less maturity, the main function of the loan account
in a bank's portfolio is to maximize earnings. Therefore, a relatively
higher proportion of term loans would have, most probably, reduced this
gap in the rate of profitability betvieen the Trust Company of Georgia and
its competitors. Moreover, consumer loans and real estate credit are
usually more profitable than business loans. Although the proportion of
these two loans is considerably high in the case of the Trust Company,
and since the delinquency rate is about \% for consumer loans, a higher
rate of return must be expected from these two classes and consequently
from the average of total loans.
In spite of the lower profitability of the loan account of the Trust
Company as compared to other banks in the sixth district, loans are still
more profitable to the bank than its investment accounts. This is true
of almost all commercial banks, because the role of securities is primarily
the provision of protective liquidity behind primary reserves while loans
are employed to be as profitable as they could. The relative functions of
these two accounts, as the major class of a bank's earning assets, does
not seem to be altered in the near future.
Conclusion
We have seen in the first three chapters for the commercial banking
industry in general and in the fourth chapter for a commercial bank in
particular, how commercial banks respond to their conflicting needs
between liquidity and profitability. The ultimate goal in all eases for
a bank is to improve its profit position idthout endangering its existence.
The precautions taken against the latter, although similar for all banks,
varies from one bank to another in detail. Thus, while a decline in bank
liquidity and an expansion in risk assets (normally long term loans and
investments) may reduce the rate of growth of loans, decisions regarding
liquidity needs and an additional ownership of risk assets are matters
of independent judgment for the banker. This conclusion seems to be sup
ported by the existence of wide divergence in ratios of loans to deposits
within the banking system. In contrast to the regional ratio of less than
$h%, for example, loans at the Trust Company of Georgia averaged 60$ of
total deposits, while the ratiot for New York City banks was about 6$%
and the national ratio, about 60% for the year ending December 31, I96J4.
Evidence of such disparities among banks point up to the great im
portance of attitudes of banks toward liquidity and profitability in the
apportionment of their earnings assets between loans and investments. It
cannot be imagined, from the study made, that banks possibly change the
structure of asset portfolios without regard to the effect that such a
redistribution may have on the ability of the bank to meet its commitments
to depositors and to stockholders. However, given that liquidity needs
and the appropriate holdings of assets endangering liquidity cannot be
estimated precisely, it is certain that standards acceptable to each bank
are reappraised. Such action has been typically taken by the Trust Company
of Georgia, particularly between the years I960 to 1962 when the bank signi
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